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PROPERTY LAW
I. LEGAL TITLE HOLDERS' PRESUMPTION OF POSSESSION REBUTTED
ONLY BY ADVERSE POSSESSION
In Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina1 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that any person who held land adversely for ten
years between 1962 and 1980, without tacking except by inheritance,
could bar the Catawba Indian Tribe's (Tribe) claim to that part of the
disputed 144,000 acres of land. The court also held that South Caro-
lina's ten year statute of limitations2 for the recovery of real property
did not bar the Tribe's claim against any other person.3 The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that only proof of adverse possession could rebut the
presumption of possession that South Carolina Code section 15-67-210
gives to a legal title holder such as the Tribe. Thus, the Tribe's admis-
sion that it had not possessed the land for 140 years did not rebut the
presumption.4
In 1980 the Tribe sued the State of South Carolina and various
parties who represent over 27,000 landowners to recover possession of
144,000 acres in northwestern South Carolina. In the 1760s the Tribe
had relinquished its aboriginal lands in South Carolina to Great Brit-
ain in exchange for a permanent resettlement on the fifteen square
mile tract of land that is in issue.5 In the 1840 Treaty of Nation Ford,
the Tribe transferred its interest in the fifteen square mile tract to the
State of South Carolina. Because the United States government did
not participate in the 1840 treaty,' the United States Supreme Court
ruled that the 1840 conveyance to South Carolina was void under the
Indian Nonintercourse Act,7 which requires federal approval of all
1. 865 F.2d 1444 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3190 (1989).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-340 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
3. Catawba Indian Tribe, 865 F.2d at 1452-54.
4. See id. (the Tribe had not possessed the land since 1840).
5. The Catawbas transferred the land in the 1760 Treaty of Pine Hill and the
1763 Treaty of Augusta.
6. Catawba Indian Tribe, 865 F.2d at 1446.
7. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988) (originally enacted as Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1
Stat. 138). The Act states in part:
No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or
claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any
validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention
entered into pursuant to the Constitution.
Id.
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transfers of Indian lands.8 Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that
the South Carolina statute of limitations did not apply to the Tribe's
claim until Congress revoked the Catawba Constitution in 1962 and
lifted federal protection.9 The Supreme Court then remanded the case
to the Fourth Circuit for it to determine the effect of the South Caro-
lina statute of limitations on the Tribe's claim after 1962.10
First, the Fourth Circuit held that the Catawba Act1 did not re-
voke the Tribe's right to invoke federal jurisdiction even though it re-
moved the Tribe's federal protection. The court also noted that federal
jurisdiction was appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question),
28 U.S.C. § 1337 (commerce issue), and 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (which ac-
cords federal jurisdiction to Indians in cases that involve federal law)."2
Second, the court held that the statutes of limitations that pertain
to parties under a disability,' 3 did not apply to the Tribe, because
American Indians were not an expressly listed class in the statutes.
14
Third, the court held that the absence of a recorded title in the
Registry of Mesne Conveyances did not defeat the Catawba's claim.
The court reasoned that legal title was not exclusively based on record
title. Instead, the court held that a survey of the land in the South
Carolina Secretary of State's office was sufficient to support the Tribe's
claim to the title."5
The defendants argued that Indian title was only equitable title
and not legal title. The court ruled that Indian title was legal title for
recovery purposes and, thereby, afforded the Tribe the presumption of
possession under South Carolina Code section 15-67-210.11 The court
made this decision for two reasons. First, under Indian title the right of
occupancy was good against all but the sovereign. If Indian title and
fee simple title co-existed, the Indian title was the superior title. Sec-
ond, to hold that Indian title precluded the presumption of possession
would conflict with the United States' policy and the Indian
Nonintercourse Act,17 which were intended to protect the Indians'
8. South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 500 (1986).
9. See 476 U.S. at 504-08.
10. See Catawba Indian Tribe, 865 F.2d at 1444.
11. 25 U.S.C. §§. 931-38 (1988).
12. See Catawba Indian Tribe, 865 F.2d at 1455-56.
13. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-3-40, -370 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
14. Catawba Indian Tribe, 865 F.2d at 1447. The state argued that the Tribe was a
disabled plaintiff from 1840 to 1962 so that when Congress lifted the disability in 1962
the Tribe only had 10 years to bring its suit. Id.
15. Id. at 1448-50.
16. Id. at 1451-52.
17. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988) (originally enacted as Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1
Stat. 138).
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PROPERTY LAW
possession.'8
Once the Fourth Circuit determined that the Catawbas held legal
title to the land in dispute, it addressed the application of the South
Carolina statute of limitations on the recovery of real property to the
Tribe's claim.19 The Code does not allow actions to recover real prop-
erty if the plaintiff has not possessed the land within ten years prior to
the commencement of the suit.20 The Code, however, presumes that a
legal title holder is in possession of the property during the previous
ten years.21 The defendants argued that even if the Tribe had legal
title, the Tribe's admission that they had not been in possession for
140 years rebutted the legal title holder's statutory presumption of
possession. The Fourth Circuit ruled, however, that only adverse pos-
session rebutted the presumption.22 Thus, the court ruled that the
Tribe could not recover from landowners who had adversely possessed
the property between 1962 (the year the Catawba Constitution was re-
voked) and 1980 (the year the Tribe filed suit). For purposes of adverse
possession claims, the court did not allow the plaintiffs to tack except
by inheritance.23
The Fourth Circuit's opinion is the first explanation of how a
party can rebut the presumption of possession under South Carolina
law. In dissent Judge Widener argued that the Tribe's judicial admis-
sion that they did not possess the land for 140 years should rebut the
presumption. 24 Under Widener's theory a defendant in an action to re-
cover real property does not need to establish adverse possession to
defeat the plaintiff's claim. Instead, the defendant can rebut a legal
title holder's presumption of possession if he demonstrates that the ti-
tle holder was not actually in possession of the property.
The Catawba majority position that adverse possession is the only
manner to rebut this presumption is supported by South Carolina
Code section 15-67-210, which states that the person with legal title is
presumed in possession "unless it appear[s] that such premises have
been held and possessed adversely .... ,,25 The statute explicitly al-
lows for rebuttal by adverse possession. Rebuttal by any other manner
must be inferred from the language of the statute, which does not sup-
port such an inference.
If Judge Widener's dissent were adopted, a plaintiff with legal title
18. See Catawba Indian Tribe, 865 F.2d at 1451.
19. See S.C. CoDE ANN. § 15-3-340 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
20. Id.
21. See id. § 15-67-210 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
22. See Catawba Indian Tribe, 865 F.2d at 1452-54.
23. Id. at 1456.
24. Id. at 1457 (Widener, J., dissenting).
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-67-210 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
1990]
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could be barred from claiming possession because of a lack of actual
physical possession within ten years. The defendant in possession may
not have clearly established title in himself through adverse possession,
leaving ultimate ownership in an uncertain state. The majority view
avoids such uncertainty by not requiring the.plaintiff holding legal title
also to be in physical possession.
Judge Widener, however, implies that fairness to all parties in-
volved is more important than certainty. His dissent stated, "The ma-
jority's approach .. . defeats the very purpose of South Carolina's
statute of limitations by allowing a state claim. If South Carolina had
intended to give parties who could establish 'legal title' no time limit to
file suit, it could have done so instead of merely creating a presump-
tion of possession.
'26
The majority's position implies that the statute of limitations does
not apply to a plaintiff once he establishes legal title. Judge Widener
points out that this approach allows the validation of stale claims.
Judge Widener's argument has merit in this case because the claim is
140 years old. He implies that a claim may be so stale and have such a
potentially great impact on landowners that it should not be allowed
even though disallowing the claim might contradict statutory law. Be-
cause of the effect this decision will have on over 27,000 landowners,
Judge Widener's argument should have been given more consideration
in Catawba Indian Tribe.
Weston Adams, III
II. INTENT DETERMINES WHICH PARTY CAN ENFORCE A CONDITION IN
REAL ESTATE SALES CONTRACTS
In Ehike v. Nemec Construction Co.2 7 the South Carolina Court of
Appeals held that the "question as to who may enforce or take advan-
tage of a condition in a contract of sale depends on the intention of the
parties as to .. .whose benefit it was inserted.' 28 The parties to a
contract for the sale and purchase of real property "may make it sub-
ject to such conditions and provisos as they may see fit, except such as
are illegal or contrary to public policy."29 These contracts frequently
provide that the sale is contingent upon the sale of real estate which
26. Catawba Indian Tribe, 865 F.2d at 1457 (Widener, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
27. 298 S.C. 477, 381 S.E.2d 508 (Ct. App. 1989).
28. Id. at 480, 381 S.E.2d at 510 (quoting 91 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser § 110(c)
(1955)).
29. 91 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser § 110(a) (1955).
[Vol. 42
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belongs to the purchaser. If the purchaser fails to sell his property, the
issue becomes whether the buyer or seller, or both, may enforce or take
advantage of this condition. The South Carolina Court of Appeals ad-
dressed this question for the first time in Ehke.
The Ehlkes and Nemec Construction Company (Nemec) entered
into a written contract whereby the Ehlkes would purchase a lot and
Nemec would build a home for them. The contract contained several
conditions. One condition stated that the property was being sold con-
tingent upon the sale of the Ehlke's current home by November 1,
1986.30 The EhIkes did not sell their home by November 1, 1986;
Nemec refused to begin construction on the EhIkes new house and de-
clared the contract void and unenforceable. The Ehlkes filed an action
to recover damages for Nemec's alleged breach of the land sale con-
tract and claimed that the condition was not enforceable at the option
of the construction company.
3 1
The Ehike decision addressed a novel issue in South Carolina.
In recent years, it has been increasingly important to identify the ben-
eficiary of the contingency and the person who may waive the exercise
of the contingency. Generally, the party who can waive the contin-
gency is also the beneficiary of it. Nonetheless, the identity of the con-
tingency's beneficiary may be unclear.32
The court of appeals, applying the general rules for construction of
contracts for the purchase and sale of land, attempted to clarify this
issue. The court of appeals held that "a condition inserted solely for
the benefit of one [party] .. .cannot be taken advantage of by the
other party" in a real estate contract.3 3 The Ehike decision established
the test in South Carolina for determining the parties' intent. Courts
should deduce intent from the language used in the contract, the sur-
rounding circumstances at the time of contract execution, and the in-,
tended purpose of the contract provision.34
The court of appeals applied its new intent test to the findings of
fact that the trial judge had determined. The evidence indicated that
the sale contingency provision was "presented by Seller's agent to buy-
ers as an optional provision, to be inserted or not, as the Buyers
30. Ehlke, 298 S.C. at 478, 381 S.E.2d at 509.
31. Id. at 477-79, 381 S.E.2d at 508-09. Nemec's agent stated that "if [Ehlke]
wanted the house built, [Ehlke] would have to come up with another $4,500." Id. at 479,
381 S.E.2d at 509.
32. Yzenbaard, Drafting the Residential Contract of Sale, 9 WhL MITCHELL L. REv.
37, 56 (1984).
33. Ehlke, 298 S.C. at 480, 381 S.E.2d at 510 (citing 91 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser
§ 110(c) (1955)).
34. Id.
1990]
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chose. '35 Contracts for the sale of real property typically contain this
type of provision to assure buyers of the funds needed to purchase the
new home and relieve them of the obligation of simultaneously paying
for two homes.3 ' The EhIke's informed Nemec two months before the
"deadline" for the sale of the buyers' present home that they were
waiving the condition.3 7 The court found these facts conclusive and de-
cided that the condition was a condition for the benefit of the Ehlke's.
Consequently, Nemec could not claim the nonoccurrence of the condi-
tion was a forfeiture, and the contract was binding on Neinec.3 s The
Ehlkes, however, had the option to cancel the sales contract if the con-
dition went unfulfilled.
The court's holding in EhIke agrees with the majority of courts in
other jurisdictions that have ruled on the status of similar conditions
contained in contracts for the sale of property. The condition at issue
in EhIke was a condition precedent to the obligation of the Ehlkes to
buy. It was not a condition precedent to the obligation of Nemec to
perform. The EhIke opinion adds strength to the argument that a con-
dition in a sales contract that makes the sale contingent upon the sale
of the purchaser's present home is not a condition precedent to the
existence of a contract between buyer and seller, but performance of
the condition is a condition precedent to further obligations under the
contract.3 9 The Ehike test determines whether this condition allows
the buyer or seller, or both, to enforce the performance of the contract.
The court of appeals applied the EhIke test four months later in
35. Id. at 479, 381 S.E.2d at 509.
36. Yzenbaard, supra note 32, at 64. The trial court in Ehike dismissed the seller's
argument that the parties also inserted the condition for the seller's benefit:
Defendant argues that it would not have undertaken the construction of such a
home unless and until plaintiffs sold their present home. Having carefully re-
considered the evidence on this point, I remain unpersuaded ....
[D]efendant offered no evidence to show that the buyers would have been una-
ble to purchase the new home without selling their old one. On the contrary,
the evidence is that the buyers could have performed without selling their pre-
sent home. More to the point, there is no credible evidence that the defendant
doubted, or had cause to doubt, plaintiffs' ability to perform, with or without
the sale of their present home. The evidence is that mortgage financing was
generally available for a high percentage of the purchase price.
Ehlhe, 298 S.C. at 479-80, 381 S.E.2d at 509-10.
37. EhIke, 298 S.C. at 479, 381 S.E.2d at 509. "The party for whose benefit a condi-
tion is inserted may, at his option, waive it .... When a condition attached to a con-
tract of sale is waived the sale is thereby rendered absolute." 91 C.J.S. Vendor & Pur-
chaser § 110(e) (1955).
38. Ehlke, 298 S.C. at 481, 381 S.E.2d at 510.
39. M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY § 1.5, at 94. (3d
ed. 1975). "A contract does not lack mutuality because of any such condition." Id.
[Vol. 42
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Century 21 Horton Real Estate, Inc. v. Sokcevic. 4° In Sokcevic the
court ruled on a similar condition which made the sale contingent upon
the buyer's ability to sell his present home by the closing date of June
15, 1986.41 The buyer was unable to sell his present home within the
initial period of the contract, and the parties agreed that if the sellers
could find another purchaser before the buyer sold his house, then the
sellers could sell the house to another purchaser. The issue before the
court was.whether the seller could enforce the condition and terminate
the contract as of June 15, or whether the buyer was the only party
allowed to take advantage of the condition.
42
The court of appeals, relying on Ehlke stated that "[w]hether a
contingency such as the one between the Buyer and the Sellers in this
case is enforceable at the option of a buyer. . . depends upon the in-
tention of the parties as to the person or persons for whose benefit the
contingency was inserted in the contract of sale.' '43 The evidence sup-
ported the finding that the sellers and the buyer entered into a con-
tract of sale that was binding upon the sellers subject to the contin-
gency of the buyer selling his present house. The sellers could avoid
the sale to the buyer only if the sellers found another purchaser before
the buyer fulfilled the contingency. The contingency, therefore, was
probably for the benefit of the buyer.4" The court apparently consid-
ered the language of the contract, the surrounding circumstances at the
time of contract execution, and the purpose of the provision.45 After
the "deadline" date passed, the buyer, not the sellers, had the option
to enforce the condition and terminate the contract. The buyer chose
not to enforce the condition. Therefore, the contract remained binding
upon the sellers and was enforceable if the buyer was able to find a
purchaser for his present house before the sellers found a purchaser for
40. 300 S.C. 8, 386 S.E.2d 270 (Ct. App. 1989).
41. Id. at 9, 386 S.E.2d at 271. If the sale of the buyer's present home did not take
place by the deadline date of June 15, 1986, "The contract stated [that the] 'closing may
have to be extended.' The Buyer testified that the extension applied 'if I was unable to
sell my house in Anderson."' Id.
42. The Sokcevic court also addressed two other issues. First, whether an effective
sale of the subject property took place at the time the parties entered into the contract
of sale even though the final closing on the property did not take place until a later date
assuming that the original contract was still binding on the parties after the "deadline"
date. Id. at 11, 386 S.E.2d at 272-73. Second, whether Century 21 Horton Real Estate,
the listing agent, was entitled to a commission even though the parties signed the con-
tract of sale prior to the listing agreement between seller and realtor. Id. at 12, 386
S.E.2d at 272-73.
43. Id. at 10-11, 386 S.E.2d at 272.
44. See id. at 11, 386 S.E.2d at 272.
45. See id. at 11-12, 386 S.E.2d at 272-73 (outlined elements of the EhIke test).
1990]
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their house.46
Although courts on occasion have held that similar contract condi-
tions were for the benefit of both parties, 47 the standard provisions
that relate to the ability of the purchaser to sell his present house in
contracts for the sale of property allow the purchaser, not the seller, to
rescind the contract if he is not able to sell the house.4 The seller,
however, is not completely at the mercy of the buyer in this instance. A
contract of sale that is conditioned on the purchaser's ability to sell the
purchaser's house requires the purchaser to make reasonable efforts to
sell the house.49 The court noted this restriction on the buyer in
Sokcevic.50
In the majority of residential real estate transactions, property is
sold and purchased through a real estate broker, and in most situa-
tions, the real estate broker will prepare the agreement of sale. Even
so, counsel may guard against the problems addressed by the court of
appeals in Ehike and Sokcevic.5 1 In light of these two decisions, it is
46. The jury, having determined that the original contract still bound the sellers,
concluded under the second issue that "the contract of sale entered into between the
Sellers and the Buyer was tantamount to a sale of the subject property... ." Id. at 11,
386 S.E.2d at 273. Finally, the court concluded that Century 21 Horton Real Estate was
not entitled to a commission because "the evidence [was] clear that the property was
submitted to and purchased by the Buyer prior to the term of the contract between the
Sellers and the Realtor." Id. at 12, 386 S.E.2d at 273.
47. See Rodgers v. Baughman, 382 N.W.2d 714, 717-18 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (a
contract of sale conditioned on purchaser's sale of his property was for the benefit of
both parties because the sale was necessary for purchasers to obtain financing);
Hodorowicz v. Szulc, 16 Ill. App. 2d 317, 320-21, 147 N.E.2d 887, 889 (1958) (condition
that sale was subject to purchasers selling their house).
48. See Cox v. Funk, 42 N.C. App. 32, 55, 255 S.E.2d 600, 602 (1979).
49. See Allison v. Lee, 333 So. 2d 149, 151 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976) (purchasers must
attempt to sell their present home within a reasonable time); Dodson v. Nink, 72 Ill.
App. 3d 59, 64, 390 N.E.2d 546, 550 (1979) (purchaser required to make reasonable
efforts).
Where a contract for the sale of realty requires a party to perform, or obtain
compliance with, a condition therein, he is bound to exercise good faith and
make a reasonable effort to perform or obtain compliance, and he will not be
relieved from liability under the contract where he fails to do so.
91 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser § 110(d) (1955).
50. See 300 S.C. at 9, 386 S.E.2d at 272.
51. Taylor, Some Agreement of Sale Basics, 4 THE PRAc. REAL EsT. LAW. 69 (1988)
(discussion of items that counsel should check or change in sales agreement).
Obviously, a contingency should be clearly drafted. Express time limits for the
waiver or exercise of the contingency should be included. While the contin-
gency is in effect, the seller typically has the" property off the market. If the
delay is long, a seller might miss several potential buyers. The seller's attorney
therefore should consider one or more of the following drafting alternatives.
First, a reasonable time period should be established for exercise or waiver of
the contingency. . . . Obviously, mutually agreed upon written extensions are
[Vol. 42
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imperative that the contract expressly indicate the identity of the con-
tingency's beneficiary. This express identification will protect either
the buyer or the seller, or both, in the long run.
Robert H. Mozingo
III. TRIAL COURTS POSSESS INHERENT AUTHORITY TO APPOINT
COMMISSIONERS TO PARTITION PROPERTY
In Anderson v. Anderson52 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that trial courts haye the inherent authority to appoint commis-
sioners to aid the courts in partitioning property. This holding renews
a prior statutory practice in South Carolina which was repealed by the
South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure."
In Anderson a dispute arose between three brothers who disagreed
about the disposition of real property which they had inherited from
their parents. One son had a one-half interest; the other two each had
a one-fourth interest. One of the brothers who had a one-fourth inter-
est operated a dairy farm on the property, which he had previously run
with his father. He maintained barns, sheds, and pastures on the prop-
erty and had purchased additional property nearby for his home."
The other two sons sued their brother for partition of the property
and requested a judicial sale of the land with the sale proceeds to be
distributed according to each owner's interest. The brother who farmed
requested an allotment of the property that would take into account
both his proportion of ownership in the property and his substantial
always an alternative. Second, the seller's attorney should consider the possi-
bility of continuing to list the property for sale. The contract of sale could
provide that the buyer has a stated period of time, for example, forty-eight
hours after receipt of notice from the seller of another bona fide offer, in which
the buyer must either waive the contingency or terminate the contract. Alter-
natively, the contract of sale could permit the seller to continue showing the
prdperty and accept other offers as long as the later offers are contingent on
the failure of the first offer to close.
Adequate provisions should be included for notice of exercise or waiver of
the contingency. The format of the notice should be specified, for example, in
writing delivered by mail to the seller. The contract should also state the con-
sequences of lack of receipt of notice by the given date. Typically, failure to
give notice results in waiver of the contingency.
Yzenbaard, supra note 32, at 55-56.
52. 299 S.C. 110, 382 S.E.2d 897 (1989).
53. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-61-60 to -90 (Law. Co-op. 1976 and Supp. 1988) (former
statutory provision which was repealed in 1985).
54. 299 S.C. at 111-12, 382 S.E.2d at 898.
1990]
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improvements to the property.5
The circuit court ordered an in-kind partition without making
findings regarding the value of the property or the structures located
on it. The lower court's order did not state the method for dividing the
property. It also failed to find damages for the destruction of the farm-
ing brother's business as a result of an outright sale. The non-farming
brothers appealed claiming that the trial court erred in ordering an in-
kind partition without valuing the various portions of the property and
in failing to set out a clear method for making the partition. 6
The supreme court initially noted that the law favors a partition
in-kind when it can be made without injury to the parties but it also
recognized the "somewhat confused state of the law in this area."5
Previously a South Carolina statute mandated the appointment of a
commissioner in cases such as this to appraise the disputed property
and determine whether a partition in-kind would be fair.5 8 The enact-
ment of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, however, re-
pealed this statute.59 The new Rules of Civil Procedure did not replace
the repealed procedure.60
The supreme court ruled that courts should still use the repealed
procedure and held that a circuit court "has the inherent authority to
appoint commissioners to aid it in effectuating a partition.6 1 The
court, therefore, filled a gap left by the legislature with this holding.
The court also ruled that probate courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction over disputes relating to the estates of decedents.6 2 The
brothers, therefore, should not have brought their claims in the circuit
court since it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to determine the
issues. The court dismissed the claims against the estate without
prejudice.1
3
Stephen Edward Spelman
55. Id. at 112, 382 S.E.2d at 898.
56. Id. at 112-113, 382 S.E.2d at 898
57. Id. at 114, 382 S.E.2d at 899.
58. See S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 15-61-60 to -90 (Law. Co-op. 1976 and Supp. 1988) (for-
mer statutory provision which was repealed in 1985).
59. Id. (editor's note).
60. The court refers to rules 17 and 71, which address procedure in partition ac-
tions without specifically addressing how to actually effect a partition. Anderson, 299
S.C. at 114, 382 S.E.2d at 899.
61. Id. at 115, 382 S.E.2d at 900.
62. Id.; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-302 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
63. Anderson, 299 S.C. at 115, 382 S.E.2d at 900.
[Vol. 42
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